game
the domain of strategic interaction. game is the phenomenon of agents whose outcomes depend on each other's choices. every time two or more agents must decide simultaneously — trade, vote, cooperate, compete, signal, bluff — game theory describes the structure of their situation and predicts the equilibrium
for cyber, game is the incentive logic. every neuron decides which particles to link and how much stake to commit. these decisions affect cyberank, which affects focus, which affects rewards. the protocol is a multi-agent game where the Nash equilibrium is honest, high-quality knowledge production. mechanism design — engineering the rules so that selfish agents produce collective good — is how cyber aligns individual incentives with planetary intelligence
scope
fundamentals — game theory, equilibrium, Nash equilibria, Shapley value, cooperative games, strategy, payoff matrices, dominant strategies. the language of strategic reasoning. a game is defined by players, strategies, and payoffs — nothing more
coordination — coordination, cooperation, coordination graphs, collective focus theorem, collective focus, stigmergy, distributed constraint optimization. how agents align without central command. the cybergraph is a coordination mechanism: cyberlinks are cooperative signals, focus is the coordination metric
mechanism design — auction, public goods, prediction markets, externality, costly signal, market making, automated market maker, Shapley value, probabilistic shapley attribution. designing rules that produce desired outcomes. cyber/rewards uses Shapley attribution to distribute tokens fairly
voting — democracy, Condorcet, jury theorem, delphi method, voting paradoxes. collective choice under strategic behavior. senate governance and proposals are voting games
evolution — evolutionary game theory, evolutionary stable strategies, replicator dynamics. game theory applied to bio: organisms are players, fitness is payoff, and evolution selects for stable strategies. the crystal's 21-domain structure is a kind of evolutionary stable allocation — removing any domain destabilizes the whole
bridges
- game → math: equilibria are fixed points. Shapley value is axiomatically unique. probability and combinatorics power solution concepts
- game → eco: ecological interactions are strategic. predator-prey, symbiosis, competition are games with evolutionary payoffs
- game → socio: governance is a game. constitutions are rules. elections are mechanisms. public goods provision is a collective action problem
- game → crypto: mechanism design, staking, auction, token incentives — crypto systems are designed games
- game → ai: multi-agent reinforcement learning is game theory meets machine learning. adversarial training is a zero-sum game
- game → cyber: the protocol is a game. neurons are players, focus is the payoff, and mechanism design ensures honest play produces intelligence