bootloader/bostrom/congress-audit.md

cyber process cyber
π 0.01% 369 words · 2 min

first multisig with gleb

ethereum: 0x9f4062F6153Ff4Dbf93F6A6F686eD3C906Bf0684

signers:

second multisg with nick

ethereum: 0xE46c088b5DD483cDa2400EE70296baD4903fC845

current multisig

ethereum: 0xa0a55e68dc52b47f8a9d5d05329fab5bdabffb14

bostrom: QmZHBdeWb7E7UQ82PXLVU15mCzoN3s7tZNfBT64wmcEDvp

chaingear fee trail (verified on-chain 2026-09-09)

Question: 22 databases × 10 ETH were paid into Chaingear 0x02e0c94355562693B3608077732d7437bd7a78ca (2019-01 → 2020-03). Where did the 220 ETH go?

Answer: nothing ever stayed in Chaingear. It is a PaymentSplitter with ONE payee holding 100/100 shares, and that payee is the cyber•Congress ops multisig 0xB52B7EdA722249499e3a28B5BB6c778ee0Ac462c (Gnosis MultiSigWalletWithDailyLimit; signers 0x00B8Fe1A + 0xfBb2A29D — the "first multisig" signers above). The multisig is also owner() of Chaingear.

getTotalReleased() = 220 ETH, getReleased(0xB52B…) = 220 ETH, getCreationFeeWei() = 10 ETH, totalSupply() = 22 CHG. Every createDatabase batch was followed by release() from 0x00B8Fe1A (10 calls).

The other 2 ETH (two fundDatabase deposits, 2019-07/09) sat in the Safe 0x86ed5b9a56b9f9ee7b399a68999c658384941ca1 until claimDatabaseFunds on databases 0 and 1 (2026-09) — that is the "found 2 ETH".

Multisig → Aragon Finance 0xa0A55e68 (the "current multisig" above; vault = Agent 0x3A1F8600): 200 ETH in 7 executed transfers — 50 (2019-12-10), 20 (12-30), 30 (2020-01-20), 10 (01-29), 20 (02-20), 10 (03-04), 60 (03-18). Matches Finance ledger inflow from 0xB52B exactly (200 ETH). The first 20 ETH of fees (Jan–Feb 2019, pre-Aragon) left the multisig on 2019-11-01 with the remaining balance straight to the Agent (24.476 + 0.42 ETH executed; three sibling ~24.9 ETH attempts were ExecutionFailure).

Finance ledger (getTransaction(1..237)): ETH in 919, out 951 (direct-to-Agent deposits don't appear as inflows). Recipients: 0xb3aE2C46 421.7 ETH / 20 payments 2021-07→2024-09 (incl. 200 on 2021-08-31, 100 on 2022-05-19; refs "BOOT liquidity", "warp listing", "Teams Funding", "reserve"); 0xda07097f 160.3 ETH / 21 payments 2019-11→2020-12; 0x97975Ed1 102 ETH / 22 payments 2020-06→2024-07 (also deposited 176.5 ETH); monthly payroll 2019-12→2020-12 to 0x8b5b2864 (57.1), 0xe8298160 (51.3), 0x00ca47db (41.1), 0x3a9d2cc5 (39.5), 0xa3da86c8 (7 × 1 ETH); one-offs 0x80631c54 35 ETH (2021-11-27), 0xc4afcc52 7.6, 0xd6e705c0 5.0, 0x00B8Fe1A 3.5.

Today: Chaingear 0 ETH, multisig 0.0002 ETH + dust tokens, Agent 0 ETH + dust (GOL/KICK/GOLD/REP). Nothing of the 220 ETH remains in any of the three contracts; it funded cyber•Congress operations 2019–2024.

Method: blockscout v2 API (txs/logs/internal), publicnode eth_call for splitter state and the full Finance ledger, sources github.com/cyberia-to/chaingear (contracts/common/PaymentSplitter.sol, chaingear/FeeSplitterChaingear.sol).

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